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Harnessing the power of
fusion? A valiant but flawed
effort to obviate the need
for a distinct mental health
law
Paul S. Appelbaum, MD1
When it comes to involuntary interventions, the notion that people with mental disorders should be
treated identically to persons with general medical disorders has an undoubted appeal. As Dawson and
Szmukler have argued previously, principles of fairness and non-discrimination would appear to be well
served by basing involuntary hospitalization and treatment in both contexts on incapacity to provide
consent.2 In this commentary, I take note of some of the intellectual forebears of the Szmukler, Daw, and
Dawson proposal,3 and ask why – despite the formidable intellects that have lined up behind similar
approaches in the past – they have not been adopted. I also consider some aspects of the current proposal
itself, including the unresolved tensions between equal and differential treatment of persons with mental
disorders, and the potential practical consequences, especially for persons with general medical
disorders.4 I conclude that the rationale for fusing two disparate bodies of law may itself be irremediably
flawed, and the undesirable consequences significant.
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The History and Status of Incapacity-Based Approaches to Mental Health Law
It was not always the case that people being hospitalized for treatment of mental disorders were dealt with
differently than people with general medical disorders, at least not in the United States. As I have written
elsewhere:
Prior to the 1830s, only a few hospitals of any sort existed in the United States, and these generally
made no distinction between the admission of patients for treatment of physical disorders and the
admission of patients for treatment of mental disorders. The same doctors cared for both. Private
institutions established their own rules for admission, which often required only that a family member
or friend guarantee payment of the patient’s bill, and that one of the hospital’s attending physicians
certify the patient for admission. Family members usually requested admission for patients who were
too confused or debilitated to speak for themselves, blurring the distinction between voluntary and
involuntary hospitalization. The right of family members and friends to act in patients’ interests was
supported by a number of early court decisions.5 [internal citations omitted]
In those early days, hospitals were reserved only for the most seriously ill, whether afflicted by mental or
general medical disorders, and the assumption that neither group was in a condition to make decisions
for themselves was probably reasonable.
This situation began to change as specialty psychiatric facilities, both public and private, proliferated in
the middle of the 19th century, and as general hospitals became more common as well. With larger
numbers of general medical beds available, medical and surgical admissions were more likely to involve
patients at an earlier stage of illness who might be more capable of making their own treatment decisions,
and hence who were given the opportunity to do so. The exception involved patients who lacked
capacity, for whom family members continued to provide consent. In contrast, in the separate psychiatric
system, even as the numbers grew of those hospitalized, the presumption remained that persons with
serious mental disorders – especially those who were subject to involuntary admission – were
incompetent, and hence could be treated without their agreement.6 These two distinct systems, running
in parallel, operated in these disparate ways for more than a century.
Among the earliest signs of an impetus for change was the Draft Act Governing the Hospitalization of
the Mentally Ill, produced by the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health in 1952.7 Suggesting a marked
deviation from the historical criteria for involuntary commitment – need for care and treatment – the
Draft Act proposed two alternative grounds for admission: a dangerousness-based criterion that looked
to the likelihood of patients harming themselves or other people; and a capacity-based criterion for people
who needed hospitalization, but could not make their own decisions.8 Although much discussed, the
5 Paul S. Appelbaum, ‘Almost a Revolution: Mental Health
Law and the Limits of Change’, 18–19 (1994).
6 Indeed, in many U.S. jurisdictions, involuntary
commitment to a state facility rendered the person
incompetent as a matter of law for many purposes,
including managing financial affairs, writing a will, voting,
and marrying, or produced a presumption in that regard.
See Frank T. Lindman & Donald M. McIntyre, Jr., 
‘The Mentally Disordered and the Law’ 220-222 (1961).
Not all authorities, however, agreed with this approach.
See, e.g., the comment of Isaac Ray, the father of
American forensic psychiatry, in his major work, 
A Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity
(1838/1983) at 471: “Restraint [i.e., hospitalization] is a
measure entirely distinct from that of interdiction [i.e.,
depriving a person of the power to conduct his or her
affairs on grounds of incompetence], and neither should be
considered, as they sometimes are, necessarily dependent
on the other.”
7 Reprinted in Lindman & McIntyre, supra note 6, at
397–424. 
8 The specific wording of the capacity criterion was: “[the
proposed patient] is in need of custody, care or treatment
in a mental hospital and, because of his illness, lacks
sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible decisions
with respect to this hospitalization.” Id. at 402.
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Draft Act had relatively little impact on commitment law in the (then) 48 states over the next decade.9
In particular, its innovative capacity-based criterion, which would have made the process of psychiatric
hospitalization for many patients (excluding commitments based on dangerousness) more similar to
admission of incompetent patients to general medical hospitals, was not widely adopted.
The 1970s in the U.S. were a time of great ferment in mental health law, with widespread concern that
need-for-care-and-treatment standards for commitment were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.10
This might have been a time when capacity-based standards, with their promise of treating all patients
alike, could have made significant inroads, especially given the precedent of the Draft Act. Indeed, in
1975, Alan Stone, the Professor of Psychiatry and Law at Harvard University, published a proposal to
accomplish exactly that. In his model, a necessary criterion for involuntary hospitalization was that “the
diagnosable [mental] illness impaired the person’s ability to accept treatment”; going a step beyond the
Draft Act, Stone would not have permitted dangerousness-based commitments in the absence of
incapacity.11 But in this pure form – much like the approach to involuntary hospitalization and treatment
proposed by Szmukler and colleagues – the Stone criteria received little support.
When another leading expert in psychiatry and law, Loren Roth, published his proposal a few years later,
he included a capacity-based criterion to “ensure that mental patients would be treated similarly to other
medical patients, namely, in the absence of their incompetency to consent or refuse, or absent an
emergency, patients may not be treated against their will.”12 However, Roth limited capacity-based
commitments to 12 weeks, and included alternative dangerousness-based criteria for which commitment
could be indefinite; for danger to others, incapacity was not required, while for danger to self it was.13
In 1982, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) issued its model law on civil commitment, the
outcome of a process guided by Stone but subject to the full influence of the diverse views in the
Association, that yielded yet another variant on a capacity-based approach. Under the APA’s standard,
emergency commitment was based on immediate dangerousness, while longer-term commitment was
predicated on both dangerousness to self or others and the absence of “capacity to make an informed
decision concerning treatment,” arguably the strictest standard of all.14 Today, a handful of U.S.
jurisdictions have models that appear to require incapacity or at least diminished capacity prior to
involuntary hospitalization for mental disorders (usually without using those terms).15 Although the
application of the capacity criterion in these jurisdictions to my knowledge has not been studied, my
contacts with at least some of these states suggest that incapacity (or the equivalent term) is usually
presumed from a refusal of hospitalization, and hence plays a minimal role in the decision to commit. 
Experience in the U.K. appears to echo the American reluctance to require incapacity as the basis for
hospitalization. Thus, in England and Wales, the recent reform of the Mental Health Act 1983 did not
include a capacity criterion, despite the urging of an expert panel – and even that panel provided an
alternative route for commitment based on “a substantial risk of serious harm to the health or safety of
9 Joint Information Service of the American Psychiatric
Association and the National Association for Mental
Health, Special Information Bulletin No. 1, Psychiatric
Points of View Regarding Laws and Procedures Governing
Medical Treatment of the Mentally Ill (September 1962).
10 See the discussion in Appelbaum, supra note 5 at 22–28.
11 Alan A. Stone, ‘Mental Health and Law: A System in
Transition’ (1975) at 66–70.
12 Loren H. Roth, ‘A Commitment Law for Patients, Doctors,
and Lawyers’, 136 Am. J. Psychiatry 1121 (1979) at 1122.
13 Id. at 1124–25.
14 American Psychiatric Association, Guidelines for
Legislation on the Psychiatric Hospitalization of Adults
(1982) at 10.
15 See Treatment Advocacy Center, State Standards for
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the patient or to the safety of other persons…”16 Scotland’s recent Mental Health (Care and Treatment)
(Scotland) Act 2003 pairs a dangerousness requirement with what appears to be a “soft” incapacity
provision, requiring that “the patient’s ability to make decisions about the provision of medical treatment
is significantly impaired because of his or her mental disorder.”17 How determination of “significantly
impaired” capacity compares in practice to a straightforward requirement that capacity be lacking is
unclear, though the U.S. experience suggests ample room for leeway with such standards.18
What accounts for the reluctance of jurisdictions to embrace a capacity-based approach to commitment,
and what implications does that have for the current proposal? The concerns seem to run in two
directions. First, a shift to a capacity-based model, with simultaneous rejection of dangerousness criteria,
may be seen as broadening the scope of commitment to include large numbers of non-dangerous persons
with mental illness who are not currently committable. Put differently, the dangerousness criterion may
be the limiting factor in the commitment process, the removal of which would open the floodgates.19 In
fact, in the only study to examine the question, Stone’s suggested criteria taken as a whole were shown
to be markedly more restrictive than the usual U.S. dangerousness-based standard.20 The possibility of
widening the net of commitability is not likely to be of great concern in England and Wales, where
existing criteria are much broader than those in the U.S., and the capacity requirement is likely to have
a restrictive effect.
Of greater concern to those making mental health policy is that a capacity-based standard will exclude
persons who are dangerous to themselves or (especially) to others, but who may retain decisional capacity
with regard to treatment decisions. The spectre of losing a means of detaining mentally ill persons who
are thought likely to wreak harm clearly raises anxiety levels among the general public, especially given
widespread beliefs that persons with serious mental illnesses are particularly dangerous.21 Efforts to
persuade the public that, as a group, people with mental disorders present only a small elevation in the
risk of violence – and that often due to substance abuse – largely have been unsuccessful.22 Nor have
studies indicating that dangerous mentally ill people who otherwise qualify for commitment are unlikely
16 Report of the Expert Committee, Review of the Mental
Health Act 1983 (November 1999) at Sec.5.95(v).
17 Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act
2003, Sec. 44(4).
18 An expert committee report on reform of the Mental Health
Act in Northern Ireland proposed a capacity-based model
that resembles in its general approach the proposal by
Dawson and colleagues. See The Bamford Review of
Mental Health and Learning Disability (Northern Ireland),
A Comprehensive Legislative Framework (August 2007),
accessed at http://www.rmhldni.gov.uk/index/published-
reports/cl-framework.htm. Although the government initially
indicated its intent to propose separate reform of mental
health and capacity legislation, it later announced a plan to
introduce a single bill that would adopt a capacity-based
approach. At this writing, the proposal has not yet been filed
and its final form remains to be seen. See McGimpsey
announces single bill approach for mental health, Northern
Ireland Executive, 10 September 2009, accessed at
http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/news/news-dhssps/news-
dhssps-10092009-mcgimpsey-announces-single.htm. 
19 Mary L. Durham & John Q. LaFond, ‘The Empirical
Consequences and Policy Implications of Broadening the
Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment’. 2 Yale L. &
Pol’y Rev. 395 (1985).
20 Steven K. Hoge, Paul S. Appelbaum & Alexander Greer,
‘An Empirical Comparison of the Stone and
Dangerousness Criteria for Civil Commitment’, 146 Am.
J. Psychiatry 170 (1989).
21 See, e.g., Bernice A. Pescosolido, John Monahan, Bruce
G. Link, Ann Stueve, & Saeko Kikuzawa, ‘The Public’s
View of the Competence, Dangerousness, and Need for
Legal Coercion of Persons With Mental Health Problems’,
89 Am. J. Pub. Health 1339 (1999).
22 For a brief summary of the data on the relationship
between mental disorder and violence, see Paul S.
Appelbaum, ‘Violence and Mental Disorders: Data and
Public Policy’, 163 Am. J. Psychiatry 1319 (2006).
Although not all research findings support the attribution
of the excess risk associated with mental disorders
exclusively to substance use, for recent confirmatory
evidence see Eric B. Elbogen & Sally C. Johnson, ‘The
Intricate Link Between Violence and Mental Disorder:
Results From the National Epidemiologic Survey on
Alcohol and Related Conditions’, 66 Arch. Gen.
Psychiatry 152 (2009).
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to be excluded by an incapacity criterion had much impact on the debate.23 Thus, capacity-based
proposals have been and are likely to continue to be opposed by policymakers who fear that public outrage
over a single episode of violence after a dangerous mentally ill person is turned away from the hospital
because he or she is deemed decisionally capable would have catastrophic political consequences. 
It therefore appears that the core of the Szmukler and colleagues’ proposal with regard to mental health law,
i.e., altering involuntary hospitalization criteria to comport with the capacity-based approach used in general
medical care, is one of those academically attractive notions that – at least until the world is a substantially
different place – is unlikely to garner sufficient support from policymakers and the public to be widely
adopted.24 One might note that this is not an entirely irrational posture for public policy: society may simply
need to have a mechanism for detaining persons thought to be imminently harmful to themselves or other
people – even if the risk is exaggerated – and the price, namely inconsistency in legal approaches to mental
and medical disorders, may be one that society is willing to pay. Moreover, insofar as people with mental
disorders can be treated and effective treatment lowers their risk of subsequent violence, there may be good
reason to single them out from the universe of dangerous persons for this kind of intervention.
Differential Treatment of People with Mental Illnesses in the Current Proposal
Given the dedication of Szmukler and colleagues to parity in dealing with mental and general medical
disorders, it is of interest to note two ways in which this proposal fails to achieve that goal, and to
speculate on why that may be. One example involves the provisions for authorizing “serious medical
treatment” (Clause 9). Although primary caregivers, who are most likely to be family members, are given
general authority to consent to treatment for persons who lack capacity (Clause 6), they do not have such
straightforward authority for a subgroup of those medical treatments deemed “serious.” In such cases, “the
agreement of an approved doctor qualified to give a second opinion on the treatment shall be obtained
before treatment proceeds.” (Clause 12) One might pose many questions about this process, including
who gets to pick the giver of the second opinion, and whether failure by a second physician to agree ends
the matter or the opinion of a third physician might be sought. 
For our purposes here, though, the interesting issue to note is which treatments are included within that
subgroup of “serious medical treatments” that require this special review. One might imagine that they
would include major surgical procedures or interventions such as bone marrow transplants with their
bimodal outcomes of curing or killing patients. Indeed, perhaps such procedures would be included, as
the proposal gives the drafters of the implementing regulations authority to create the list of covered
treatments. However, there are two exceptions: electroconvulsive therapy and “medication for mental
disorder beyond the period of 3 months” are the only two procedures that are specified in the statute itself
as requiring this extra level of review.25 The authors are silent on why they created these two exceptional
23 Hoge, Appelbaum & Greer, supra note 20; John
Monahan, Mary Ruggiero, & Herbert D. Friedlander,
‘Stone-Roth Model of Civil Commitment and the
California Dangerousness Standard’, 39 Arch. Gen.
Psychiatry 1267 (1982). Note that the Monahan, et al.
study showed a much greater impact of a competence
criterion in the emergency setting than when longer-term
commitment was at issue.
24 Northern Ireland’s recently announced intention to
introduce a capacity-based approach, may change these
attitudes, if it is implemented as intended and succeeds in
avoiding the generally feared outcomes, but it is likely to be
some years before we can judge the consequences of the
Northern Ireland experiment.
25 Clause 12 requires another level of review, by a Tribunal,
for a second group of procedures, including withdrawing
nutrition or hydration, organ or bone marrow donation,
and non-therapeutic sterilization. The latter two
traditionally have been deemed beyond the power of
substitute decision makers to authorize, requiring court
review. I consider withdrawal of nutrition or hydration
below.
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categories, and why both involve treatments for mental disorders, although it is clear that level of risk
alone cannot be the reason. 
A second example of continuing disparate treatment of those with mental and general medical disorders
deals with the only class of capable persons who, under this proposal, would be treatable against their will.
Under Clause 45(2), persons found not guilty by reason of insanity or unfit to plead can be treated
involuntarily if such treatment is in their interests or for the protection of others, their disorders were
related to their offences, and treatment is likely to reduce the risk of recurrence of their criminal
behaviour.26 This group of persons who have committed – but not been convicted of – crimes are thus
deprived of the right of a competent person to decide about treatment that otherwise motivates this
entire proposal. Ironically, had these people simply been convicted of their offences, regardless of their
need for treatment or its likelihood of reducing their recidivism, they could not have been treated against
their will (see Clauses 43, 44, and 46). The authors explain the deviation from their principles embodied
in this provision as justified “in order to prevent harm to others.” 27
What might account for this continued differentiation between mentally ill and medically ill persons? At
some level, the authors seem to be acknowledging that traditional public concerns about being protected
from persons with mental disorders – no matter how irrational their concerns may be – and avoiding
abuse of persons with mental disorders create a different set of issues where psychiatric treatment is
concerned, requiring different statutory and regulatory oversight. Perhaps they are wrong in this belief,
and the anomalies can be corrected merely by eliminating these two outlying provisions from the
proposal. But if they are correct, the exceptions noted here call into question the desirability of merging
general health law as it relates to incapacity and mental health law. Looking at the proposal from the
perspective of its effect on people with general medical disorders reinforces the concern that perhaps the
project overreaches in its goal.
Effects on People with General Medical Disorders Who Lack Decisional Capacity
To this point, I have examined the proposal from the perspective of the impact it would have on the
treatment of people with mental disorders. However, there is another – probably even larger – group of
people who would be affected by the incorporation of provisions such as these into law: people with
general medical disorders who lack capacity to make treatment decisions. As general hospitals admit a
patient group that is, on average, sicker than in the past, the proportion of persons lacking capacity in
this population is likely to be substantial.28 Hence, we should be sensitive to the possibility that merging
the rules governing their treatment with mental health law would work to their disadvantage.
Decisions about hospital admission and general medical treatment for incapable persons (e.g., elderly
persons with Alzheimer’s or other dementias) traditionally were made by their loved ones, and that
continues to be true in the U.S. today. Indeed, in the early 1980s, urging that this practice continue, the
26 As best I can determine, neither judicial nor Tribunal
review is required under this Clause.
27 Note that those defendants found unfit to plead cannot be
treated to restore their capacity to proceed to adjudication,
unless also incapable of deciding about treatment, raising
an additional set of policy issues that I do not have the
space to consider here. I note, however, that the group of
people who are unfit to plead but still have capacity to
make medical treatment decisions may not be small. See
Norman G. Poythress, Richard J. Bonnie, John Monahan,
Randy Otto & Steven K. Hoge, ‘Adjudicative
Competence: The MacArthur Studies’ (2002) at
104–110.
28 One English study estimated that more than 40% of
patient in a general medical hospital lacked decision
making capacity. See Vanessa Raymont, William Bingley,
Alec Buchanan, Anthony S. David, Peter Hayward,
Simon Wessely, Matthew Hotopf, ‘The Prevalence and
Associations of Mental Incapacity in Medical Inpatients’,
364 Lancet 1421 (2004).
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President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine noted that family members are
generally the most concerned about the good of the patient and most knowledgeable about the patient’s
preferences and values, and that families deserve recognition in this context as important social decision-
making units.29 Yet, Szmukler and colleagues’ proposal would infringe on the traditional prerogatives of
families in a variety of ways.
“Serious medical treatment,” however that is ultimately defined, would require the agreement of a second
physician before it could be implemented, regardless of the family’s desires. Perhaps more significantly,
decisions “to withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition or hydration from a person in a permanent
vegetative state or a minimally conscious state” – among the most sensitive of decisions with which
families have traditionally grappled – will require review by a Tribunal (Clause 12(5)), with all the time,
costs to the system, and stress for the already anguished family that this process implies.30 Another clause
of the document goes further, specifying that even a substitute decision maker appointed by the patient
would not have the power of “giving or refusing consent to life sustaining treatment unless the power
expressly so provides” (Clause 49(5)).31 That suggests recourse to a Tribunal in these cases as well. The
words of the President’s Commission almost 3 decades ago, addressed to the possibility of judicial review
of families’ decisions, are apropos here:
Judges may not feel that they are able to add very much to the decisions already reached by those
most intimately involved, particularly in cases that are brought simply to obtain judicial sanction for
an agreed course of conduct…Since this judgment requires substantial understanding of the patient’s
medical condition and options, the court may simply defer to the recommendation of the treating
physician. The courts’ vaunted disinterest may be closer, in practical effect, to lack of interest.32
Thus, the proposal is likely to complicate and extend the decision-making process at the most difficult
period for family members, to no apparent gain.
Other areas where similar effects can be seen are treatment over objection and physical restraint. Given
29 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
Making Health Care Decisions: The Ethical and Legal
Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient-
Practitioner Relationship, Vol. 1: Report (1982) at
181–184.
30 I am grateful to Dr. Szmukler for pointing out to me that
both this provision and the provision addressed in the
following footnote reflect current law in England and
Wales. Recourse to the courts in these cases apparently has
been required since the 1993 decision of the House of
Lords in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland ([1992] UKHL 5
(04 February 1993)). Thus, those jurisdictions would
experience no change in relevant practices under this
proposal. However, given that this statute is aimed at
eliminating anomalies and improving the current system, I
would commend to the authors the virtues of keeping these
cases out of the courts, and would hope that other
jurisdictions that might be influenced by this model law
would avoid creating these complications for themselves.
Moreover, I note that the Law Lords in Bland themselves
appeared reluctant to require indefinite application to the
courts, with Lord Goff’s opinion expressing “the hope that
the President of the Family Division…will soon feel able to
relax the present requirement so as to limit applications for
declarations to those cases in which there is a special need
for the procedure to be invoked”; and Lord Keith’s opinion
suggesting judicial review “at least for the time being and
until a body of experience and practice has been built up
which might obviate the need for application in every
case.” Has 17 years been sufficient for that body of
experience to have been developed?
31 This limitation is embodied in the Mental Capacity Act,
Sec. 11(8)(a). However, perhaps on grounds similar to
those offered in the previous footnote, consideration might be
given in the model law to removing this restriction on powers
of appointed surrogates. Note two other apparent anomalies
created by this clause: 1) the preclusion of substitute
decision makers appointed by the patient from giving consent
to life-sustaining treatment, for which it is difficult to discern
a policy justification and which in any event usually occurs
in an emergent context and would be covered by the blanket
authority provided to treaters under Sec. 11; 2) the
application of this limitation to a surrogate decision maker
appointed by the patient, but not (as best I can tell) to the
primary carer or other person designated to make decisions
for the patient, who may be less likely to know or represent
the patient’s desires than someone selected by the patient.
32 Ibid. at 186–187.
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the prevalence of patients with dementia and delirium in general hospitals who often resist treatment –
with reactions that range from pulling out intravenous lines or nasogastric tubes, to attempting to get out
of bed and leave, to refusing to swallow oral medication – restraint and involuntary treatment are a
common and unavoidable aspect of acute medical care.33 However, under this proposal, a need for
compulsory detention and treatment is governed by Part V, and invokes an elaborate set of procedural
protections, including assessment and registration with the local health authority (Clause 22), and by the
end of 24 hours (during which only emergency treatment can be provided (Clause 28(1)(a)), a “health
or social care professional” must examine the patient, report to the appropriate authority, and agree to
the continuation of compulsory detention for another 7 days (but again apparently only emergency
treatment (Clause 28(1)(a)). Before the end of a week, application must be made for review by a Tribunal,
and the procedures go on from there. Similar procedural requirements appear to apply to a demented or
delirious patient who needs hospital admission, but is resisting that option.
What is going on here? Routine decisions, most often made by family members and invariably taken in
patients’ interests, have been entombed under a pyramid of complex procedures at substantial costs to
families, hospitals, and the broader society. I suggest that this outcome may be the result of attempting to
deal at the same time with the mental health and general medical systems, with their very different
histories of oversight and regulation. Treatment in general medical hospitals is generally consensual, and
when it is not, i.e., when patients are incapable of offering consent, family members ordinarily provide
consent on behalf of loved ones. Society is generally of the opinion that the system has worked well – that
is, to patients’ benefit – and there has been little reason or impetus to suggest radical change.
Regulation of the mental health system, however, has a very different history. Admission and treatment
have often been non-consensual, with decisions taken away from both patients and families. Abuse and
neglect have been all too common in the past, and periodic exposes have led to repeated calls for tighter
regulatory oversight. Hence, an elaborate structure has developed to regulate mental health treatment,
with distinct mental health acts. Since neither patients (because of the presumption that their capacities
are impaired), families (because of the belief that they often will place their own interests above those of
patients), nor treaters (because of the legacy of abuse) are trusted to make admission and treatment
decisions, frequent resort is had to judicial or quasi-judicial processes. Despite endless debate over the
substantive and procedural detail of mental health law, there appears to be no sentiment in favour of
simply removing this legal superstructure. 
These may be essentially incompatible bodies of law and regulation. Attempting to fuse them, as in
Szmukler and colleagues’ proposal, may inevitably result in overregulation of the general medical care
system or under-regulation of the mental health system. Here, applying a model drawn from the mental
health law tradition of tight oversight and external review of end-of-life decisions and of treatment
involving restraint or compulsory treatment (with elements borrowed directly from the Mental Capacity
Act), they create a structure that materially disadvantages the general medical system, patients, and
families. The seeming inevitability of this outcome or its converse, namely a mental health system without
adequate oversight, leads to the question of whether attempting to fuse mental health law with the law
governing general medical treatment of incapable patients is an inherently quixotic endeavor.
33 Paul S. Appelbaum, Loren H. Roth, ‘Patients Who Refuse Treatment in Medical Hospitals’, 250 JAMA 1296 (1983).
Journal of Mental Health Law Special issue
32
Conclusion
Szmukler, Daw and Dawson justify their proposal on the grounds of fairness, and argue that disparate
treatment of persons with mental disorders and general medical disorders violates that rule. However,
fairness does not require that we treat all people equally, only that those persons who are similarly situated
be treated the same. As the discussion above suggests, a case can certainly be made that the two groups
in question here are situated quite differently. People with mental disorders evoke (not entirely irrational)
concerns about violence and other criminal behavior, as Szmukler and colleagues recognize in proposing
an exception to the general rule that competent persons cannot be treated over their objections. In
addition, treatment of mental disorders is embedded in a system in which the quality and even the
beneficence of the care being provided has been called repeatedly into question, leading to the
development of an extensive regulatory structure. This too appears to be acknowledged in the proposal
in singling out treatment with psychotropic medication and electroconvulsive therapy for special
regulation as “serious medical treatments.” 
Fusing legal regulation of such different systems of care, especially when the costs are likely to be
substantial (here largely imposed on the general medical system), may simply not make a great deal of
sense. The work that would be involved in that effort might better be put to use improving each distinct
body of law.
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